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Abstract 
Research summary: Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social 
context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the 
institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear 
family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to 
behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family-owned firms have 
higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single-owner or unrelated-
owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on 
external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are 
married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and 
performance among firms.  
Managerial summary: Despite the prevalence of the married couple ownership structure in firms, 
little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We 
examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely 
held Western European firms. We find that married-owners family firms are managed more 
conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family-owned firms. In 
particular, married-owners family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external 
finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our 
findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and 
performance, and highlight some potential trade-offs to performance when married couples control 
firms. 
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Introduction 
Family firms are prevalent across the world and comprise a significant share of assets and economic 
activity. It is fitting, therefore, that researchers have devoted significant effort to understanding how 
family involvement in a business affects corporate strategy. Most scholars concur that a 
fundamental difference between family and non-family firms is that factors such as emotional 
attachment to the firm and affective ties among owners play a more important role in family firms 
than in non-family firms (Gersick et al., 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, a systematic 
examination of these factors is still largely missing (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2005). In 
this paper, we examine the social context of ownership. We distinguish among different types of 
social ties among owners and show that these distinctions have important consequences for firm 
strategy and performance. 
Previous research on the effects of family ownership has yielded mixed or conflicting results. On the 
one hand, the literature suggests that, especially among founder-managed firms and in developed 
countries, family ownership improves financial performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 
2008; Minichilli et al., 2010). On the other hand, family ownership has been associated with a 
number of problems, including low investment, conservative cash policies, and slow growth (Mishra 
and McConaughy, 1999; Gallo et al., 2004; Block, 2012; Miller et al., 2013; Patel and Chrisman, 
2014). Drawing on embeddedness theory (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2009, 2011) and the institutional logics perspective (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008; Miller et al., 2011), we argue that these findings cannot be properly understood 
without examining the social context in which owners operate. Institutional logics provide social 
actors with "assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to interpret organizational reality, 
what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to succeed" (Thornton, 2004: 70). The social 
context of ownership, as captured by the nature and intensity of affective ties among shareholders, 
can influence how owners manage their firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2007; 
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Miller et al., 2011). Lone owners, or owners with no affective ties to other shareholders, may be 
more willing to take on risk and adopt strategies of growth. Family owners, by contrast, may 
perceive themselves as `family nurturers' and may use the firm to generate stable, secure income for 
family members (Miller et al., 2011). This conservative logic is likely to be most pronounced among 
married owners who may perceive the firm as a legacy or bequest to their children. These altruistic 
concerns may translate into a concern for the long-term performance and survival of the firm, which 
may induce married owners to both work hard (thus raising profits) and behave conservatively. 
We study the social context of ownership using detailed data on a large panel of private firms across 
Europe. We distinguish among lone or single owners, family owners, and unrelated owners. We 
define family-owned firms as those having at least two shareholders with the same last name 
holding a majority of the company shares. Thus, our focus is on family ties between owners, rather 
than family ties between employees and owners or between current and future owners. Family-
owned firms represent 25% of firms in our sample of 228,253 firms, and almost 40% of the 152,245 
firms with at least two shareholders. Among family-owned firms, we distinguish between firms that 
are predominantly owned by a married couple versus those that are predominantly owned by other 
types of family members, such as parents and children or siblings. 
Our analysis indicates that family owners are associated with more conservative management 
strategies and slower growth. Family-owned firms rely more on internal cash reserves and less on 
outside debt when financing their assets. Also, sales growth and investment rates at family-owned 
firms are on average lower than at non-family-owned firms. Associated with these more 
conservative strategies are stronger measures of financial performance. Family-owned firms on 
average have higher returns on assets, profit margins, and survival rates than non-family-owned 
firms. The ability or willingness of family owners to keep wages down partly explains their superior 
financial performance. 
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The results are strongest for firms whose two largest shareholders are married. Married owners are 
especially likely to adopt conservative strategies relative to other types of owners. The results hold 
both cross-sectionally and when focusing only on firms that experience ownership changes and are 
strengthened when instrumenting for married family ownership. We control for several factors that 
could bias our results, such as differences between genders and ownership concentration at the 
family level, and find that our results are robust. One important caveat is that the vast majority of 
firms in our sample are very small---the median firm has just 8 employees. For the owners of these 
small firms, providing a secure source of income to family members is likely to be a major concern. 
More research is needed to establish to what extent our findings generalize to much larger family-
owned firms. 
Our paper contributes to a literature examining how owners' and managers' social context affects 
firm strategy and performance (Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Carpenter, 2002; Miller et al., 2010; Minichilli et 
al., 2010). Our results do not support the agency-theoretic view that family-owned firms perform 
better and are more likely to survive because there are fewer conflicts of interest among owners or 
better monitoring between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, family-
owned firms exhibit higher returns, profits and survival relative to single-owner firms, in which 
conflicts of interest among owners are absent. The results also do not support the simplistic view 
that being part of the same family is sufficient to eliminate agency conflicts or enhance motivation. 
We find significant differences between types of family owners, suggesting that the intensity of 
family ties strongly influences owners' values and behaviors. In particular, marriage appears to be 
associated with a change in logics that puts greater weight on preserving wealth for future 
generations. This is consistent with the idea that people's propensity to take risks changes over time 
depending on how they frame their personal circumstances (Wiserman and Gomez- Mejia, 1998). 
The evidence also supports the institutional logics' view that the symbolic and material aspects of 
organizational life are closely intertwined (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), 
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and that marriage is a ritual that reinforces a specific set of beliefs and obligations (Thornton et al., 
2012). 
From a more general standpoint, our analysis underscores the importance of distinguishing between 
different types of affective ties when theorizing about family firms, and points to the key role of 
marital ties in explaining inter-firm differences in strategy and performance. 
 
Theoretical background 
The notion of "family" in family firms 
There is no universally accepted definition of a family firm. Most definitions in the literature are 
operational, focusing on some combination of dimensions of family involvement in a business, such 
as ownership, management, and transgenerational succession (Chua et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2007). 
Some authors for instance define family firms as those owned and controlled by a single individual 
or a family, while others define family firms as those that are both owned and managed by family 
members. 
An even more basic problem, rarely addressed in the literature, is what is meant by "family" in the 
family firm context. One key distinction is the one between lone owners or founders and broader 
family involvement (Miller et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2011). Microsoft, for instance, is classified as a 
"family" firm by Anderson and Reeb (2003) but, as Dyer (2006) notes, while the impact of Bill Gates 
the founder cannot be underestimated, the effect of the Gates family on the firm is much more 
debatable. On the other hand, it is difficult to downplay the role of the family and transgenerational 
succession in firms such as Wal-Mart, Koch Industries and In-N-Out Burger. 
When family involvement is deemed as important, the issue arises of how to delimit family 
boundaries. Anthropologists have long noted that the concept of family is a culturally ambiguous 
one, for the type and intensity of family ties vary considerably between groups and cultures (Levi-
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Strauss, 1969; Eller, 2009). In everyday Western discourse, the term family typically refers to "a 
group of people related to one another by blood or marriage" (Oxford Dictionary). This definition 
highlights the two fundamental mechanisms that give rise to families: the "horizontal" principle of 
marriage, which "links different individuals (and groups) together and establishes new groups," and 
the "vertical" principle of descent, which links "individuals and groups through time and "down" 
between the generations" (Eller, 2009: 182). 
To be sure, focusing exclusively on the principles of marriage and descent can be restrictive. The 
emotions that are thought to differentiate family firms from non-family firms---a sense of 
togetherness, shared vision and destiny, mutual trust, etc.---can also be found in groups larger than 
the nuclear or extended family (Stewart, 2003; Karra et al., 2006). To emphasize this, Peredo (2003) 
introduces the term "kin-based business" to extend the traditional family firm construct beyond the 
biological family and to include spiritual relations marked by social, cultural and religious rituals of 
incorporation. Karra et al. (2006) similarly stress the importance of distant kin and ethnic ties (the 
"quasi-family") in a business context. 
In this paper, we use the term "family" in the traditional but more restrictive sense of a group of 
people related to one another by blood or marriage. In the empirical part, we refer to firms whose 
owners are family members as family-owned firms, and include in the set of family-owned firms only 
those that have two or more family-related shareholders. Firms owned by a single individual are 
categorized as single-owner firms. Thus, we distinguish between (multi-person) family owners and 
lone, or single, owners. Among family owners, special attention is paid to owners that are married to 
each other. By contrast, when reviewing the existing literature, as in the next subsection, we will 
typically use the all-embracing term "family firm," due to the aforementioned heterogeneity in 
definitions used. 
 
The "family effect" on firm performance 
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Since its inception, family firm research has been concerned with identifying differences in 
performance and behavior between family and non-family firms. In so doing, it has highlighted 
several economic and non-economic factors that can potentially be responsible for these 
differences. 
Among the economic factors, two occupy center stage: lack of wealth and human capital 
diversification and agency problems. Family owners typically have a large portion of their wealth tied 
up in their firm; moreover, to the extent that they also manage their firms, their human capital is 
also tied to the business. This lack of diversification can induce family owners to avoid risk and 
behave conservatively, compared to the shareholders of widely held corporations (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994). 
Family and non-family firms also differ in the extent to which they are affected by different types of 
agency problems. The fundamental agency problem in widely held corporations stems from the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers who have only a limited 
stake in a company may use their power to further their own interests at the expense of company 
shareholders. The separation of ownership and control is typically a much less severe problem in 
family firms, where ownership is often highly concentrated and management and ownership tend to 
coincide. On the other hand, concentrated family ownership can give rise to a `principal-principal' 
problem, whereby family shareholders extract private benefits of control from their companies, at 
the expense of minority shareholders (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Feldman et al., 2014). 
Family and non-family firms also differ in the extent to which they are affected by non-economic 
factors. As a general rule, non-economic factors are believed to play a much more important role in 
family firms than in non-family firms (Gersick et al., 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Non-economic 
factors can complement business values, thus creating competitive advantage, or can conflict with 
business values, thus creating competitive disadvantage. Identification with the firm, for instance, 
may induce family members to work hard and not give up in the face of adversity. On the other 
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hand, parents may have biased views about the ability of their children or may find it difficult not to 
grant them important positions in their firms. Thus, nepotistic practices may be commonplace in 
family firms. 
Because so many factors can affect family and non-family firms, establishing whether family 
ownership is beneficial or detrimental to firm performance is fundamentally an empirical question. 
Moreover, empirical findings are likely to be context-specific---dependent on the type of firms, 
owner characteristics, performance measures and institutional settings considered. Among the 
numerous studies that have examined performance differences between family and non-family 
firms, many have found that, especially when the founder still manages the firm and in developed 
countries, family ownership is associated with superior financial performance (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Miller et al., 2008). However, when succession occurs, problems tend to arise. For instance, 
Villalonga and Amit's (2006) and Perez-Gonzalez's (2006) results indicate that, in family firms, 
capable founders are often replaced by less capable family heirs. Likewise, Miller et al. (2013) find 
that family CEOs underperform as firms get larger and shareholders more dispersed, and Minichilli 
et al. (2010) find that factions in family management teams can worsen firm performance. 
 
Unbundling the "family effect": institutional logics and the social context of owners 
The literature discussed above suggests that the identity of firm owners is a key determinant of firm 
performance. In this paper, we delve deeper into the identities and social roles of firm owners. 
Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that close 
affective ties between owners influence how they manage their firms. 
Institutional logics, such as those of the market or the family, provide owners with assumptions, 
cognitive frames and values that allow them to interpret organizational reality (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). They are "formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers" (Thornton, 2004: 2); they also "guide the 
allocation of attention by shaping what problems and issues get attended to and what solutions are 
likely to be considered in decision making" (Thornton et al., 2012: 90; Ocasio, 1997). Logics have 
been found to influence organizational practices, such as in the context of leadership succession and 
human resource management (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Chung and 
Luo, 2013), firm downsizing (Greenwood et al., 2010), and social responsibility (Lounsbury, 2007). 
Embeddedness theory helps to explain how logics emerge. Embeddedness theory holds that 
economic action is influenced by the social context in which agents operate: "[p]eople live within 
networks of relationships where information, ideas, passions, and values are shared" (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2009: 1176; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Embeddedness in a social structure 
can promote economic performance by facilitating coordination, cooperation and information 
exchange between agents (Uzzi, 1996; Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002), but can also 
impede it if relationships become hostile (Uzzi, 1996; Walter et al., 2014). A social structure in which 
virtually all owners are embedded in is the family. Building on Miller et al. (2011), we distinguish 
between single (or lone) owners and family owners. Single owners can have families, but their 
families do not hold significant stakes in their firms. By contrast, family owners are defined as two or 
more family-related individuals who hold significant stakes in the same firm. 
Because family owners are likely to live and work in proximity to each other and to be exposed to 
each other's needs, they may develop a more familiar orientation than single owners or family-
unrelated owners (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009, 2011; Miller et al., 2011). They may come to 
perceive them- selves as `family nurtures' and may develop a conservative logic that emphasizes the 
preservation of wealth for future generations. 
Greater embeddedness within the family can engender conservatism for a number of reasons. First, 
to preserve family harmony, compromise and unanimity among family owners may be sought. But 
compromise and unanimity can make change more difficult to happen, hampering investment and 
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growth. Strong ties among the members of a group may also promote conformity and resistance to 
change (Granovetter, 1973; Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Sentiments such as, "things are done this way 
because Dad did them this way" are commonplace in family-owned firms (Leach, 2007: 11). Family 
owners may also frequently remind each other that their primary duty is to provide income and 
security to the whole family. They may be particularly reluctant to invest and/or take on debt, as 
these strategies may compromise family control and welfare. By contrast, single or unrelated owners 
may develop weaker "bridging" ties with a multiplicity of stakeholders. This may favor a less 
parochial agenda, and engender a more entrepreneurial logic. Thus, single or unrelated owners may 
be more likely than family owners to adopt strategies of growth (Miller et al., 2011). 
     
Hypothesis 1. Family-owned firms will adopt more conservative strategies than single-owner and 
unrelated-owners firms. 
     
The identity of the owners of a firm can also affect firm performance (Rumelt, 1991; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006; Xia and Walker, 2015). However, how the values and priorities of family owners may 
affect firm performance is, a priori, unclear. On the one hand, conservative strategies that fail to 
invest in the future can be detrimental to performance (Miller et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, some entrepreneurs are overly optimistic, and a more cautious strategic approach 
can help offset this. Moreover, in the short term at least, cutting investment boosts profits by 
reducing expenditures. 
More conservative policies can also increase profitability by allowing firms to reduce their wage 
costs. If family-owned firms are managed more conservatively and have lower probability of failure 
(as we document in this paper), then they may be able to pay lower wages, or defer wages, since 
employees have less risk of losing their job. Consistent with this view, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find 
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that, among publicly traded French firms, family ownership, especially when the firm is heir-
managed, is associated with lower wages even after controlling for the firm's skill structure, and 
employment is smoothed out over the business cycle. Sraer and Thesmar suggest that many family-
owned firms, in exchange for lower wages, provide their workers with long-term implicit insurance 
contracts. 
Finally, a familiar orientation can boost performance for reasons unrelated to conservatism. It has 
long been noted in the family firm literature that a familiar orientation can be a source of 
competitive advantage by increasing commitment to the long-term success of the firm. For instance, 
the desire to preserve family control and firm value for future generations may motivate family 
owners to adopt more efficient business practices (Colli, 2002). 
     
Hypothesis 2. Family-owned firms will exhibit superior financial performance relative to single-
owner and unrelated-owners firms. 
     
The effect of marital ties 
Miller et al. (2011) distinguish between lone founders and family owners, but do not examine the 
different types of bonds that exist between family owners. Yet, some bonds are obviously stronger 
than others, and owners' values and priorities may be shaped by the intensity of such bonds. 
Embeddedness theory also emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity in social ties (Granovetter, 
1973, 1985) and suggests that different logics are embedded in different systems of social relations 
(Uzzi, 1996, 1997). For instance, Uzzi (1996, 1997) finds in his study of New York's apparel industry 
that one-shot, anonymous transactions ("market ties") are characterized by a market logic where 
costs or money are everything, while long-term relationships ("embedded ties") exhibit a logic of 
exchange where trust, fine-grained information transfer and joint problem solving feature 
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prominently. Long-term, emotionally close relationships ("strong ties") have also been associated 
with group think, risk-aversion, and adherence to the status quo (Granovetter, 1973; Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989). 
The bond between husband and wife is undoubtedly one the strongest family ties. Married couples 
constitute the basis of the nuclear family---a household consisting of a father, a mother, and their 
children. In terms of strength, marital ties arguably rank second only to the bond between parent 
and child, and they can be further `cemented' by the appearance of children. Thus, the literature on 
embeddedness suggests that firms owned by married couples may display particularly high levels of 
risk-aversion and adherence to the status quo. 
An important reason why married owners may adopt particularly conservative management and 
cash policies is that married owners may come to perceive the firm as a legacy or bequest to their 
children. They may be concerned that, by pursuing risky strategies, this bequest may be squandered. 
Other types of family owners such as sons and daughters may be less risk-averse because for them 
legacy concerns are less salient. Institutional logics researchers have similarly pointed out that 
marriage is a ritual that reinforces a specific set of obligations---those "oriented to the reproduction 
of family members" (Thornton et al., 2012: 44). The conservative logic of married owners can be also 
reinforced through deliberation. Conversations between husband and wife often revolve around 
children and their welfare. By contrast, two brothers, even if both married, may discuss family-
related matters less, and may focus more on growing the business. Thus, the conservative logic of 
family owners may be especially strong among married owners. 
     
Hypothesis 3. Married-owners' family firms will adopt more conservative strategies than non-
married- owners' family firms. 
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Concerns for the welfare of children may not only induce married owners to behave more 
conservatively, but may also motivate them to work hard. Research in psychology and evolutionary 
biology suggests that altruism is strongly asymmetric: Parents care much more about their children's 
welfare than children care about the welfare of their parents or that of their siblings (see, for 
instance, Dawkins, 2006). Thus, to the extent that married owners have or will have children, they 
may exhibit particularly strong altruistic motives. They may work hard to provide for their children, 
especially young ones. In addition, because married couples typically live together and jointly own 
many common resources outside the firm, they may be better able to monitor one another, trade 
information, and enforce implicit contracts relative to other types of owners. Consistent with this, 
Parker (2008) finds evidence of stronger knowledge spillovers between married owners relative to 
non-married owners, and Wong (1986) shows that family businesses may utilize human capital 
resources to greater effect and increase the gains from marriage. 
Given such motivations, we expect ownership by married couples to be associated with superior 
financial performance. 
     
Hypothesis 4. Married-owners family firms will exhibit superior financial performance than non-
married- owners family firms. 
     
The primary implication that follows from our analysis is that married owners in particular should 
display a conservative orientation and a commitment to the long-term success of the firm (leading to 
superior financial performance). We view this familiar orientation or logic as a natural consequence 
of altruistic concerns for the welfare of future generations. These issues are likely to be prominent 
especially for small business owners, who are most likely to be concerned with providing income 
security to other family members. We also expect non-married family owners to exhibit a 
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conservative orientation and a commitment to the long-term success of the firm, albeit to a lesser 
extent than married family owners. 
 
Data 
We obtain our data from Amadeus, a database maintained by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) that contains 
ownership and financial statement information for firms in several European countries. BvD obtains 
its data from regulatory filings as well as from its own proprietary sources and includes both private 
and public firms in its data collection. Amadeus also contains detailed ownership information, 
including the names of each shareholder, the number of shares held, and detailed information on 
the board of directors and management of each firm. 
We build our sample from firms located in Western European countries. 48% of the firms are from 
France, 28% are from Spain, 20% are from Great Britain and the remaining firms, 4%, are from Italy. 
German firms are excluded because they do not report information on profits or assets. We also 
eliminate observations from countries such as Norway and Denmark for which there are few non-
missing observations for our variables of interest. We retain only those firms for which we have 
ownership information, and we exclude any firms for which we are unable to identify at least 90% of 
reported shareholders and those whose annual sales and profits are not reported. This leaves us 
with 228,253 firms and 1,258,172 observations for the period 1997-2006. 
 
Classification of firms into ownership categories 
We split our firm sample by ownership type using four basic ownership categories: lone or single 
owners, married family owners, non-married family owners, and unrelated owners. A fifth 
ownership category, family owners, aggregates the categories of married family owners and non-
married family owners. 
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We classify a firm as having a single owner if it has only one registered shareholder. We classify a 
firm as having unrelated owners if the two leading shareholders do not have the same last name and 
there is no family name that in aggregate holds the majority of equity stakes. We classify a firm as 
family-owned if at least two shareholders have the same last name and hold a majority of the 
company shares. A family-owned firm is said to have married owners if the two leading shareholders 
have the same last name and are of different gender. Gender information is taken from several 
sources. First, for a subset of shareholders (shareholders that also appear on the firm's manager or 
director lists), Amadeus provides a gender variable. Second, in many cases, names include a "Mr." or 
"Mrs." prefix which explicitly identifies the person's gender. Third, for the set of shareholders for 
whom Amadeus does not identify a gender, we use several public sources to learn about the most 
common male and female names for different countries.4 This classification scheme for married-
owners family firms may include some firms in which the leading shareholders are not married, e.g., 
those owned by a brother and sister, and may exclude some firms in which the leading shareholders 
are married but in which the wife does not take the husband's last name. Misclassification will 
introduce measurement error into our measures, biasing our estimates against finding any 
differences between ownership categories. We also examine "cleaner" definitions of married family 
owners for a smaller sample of firms and report on this analysis in Section 5.6. Finally, we classify a 
firm as having non-married family owners if the two leading shareholders have the same last name 
and are of the same gender. 
23% of firms in our sample are classified as family-owned. Of these, 41% have married owners, and 
59% have non-married family owners. 41% of our firms fall in the unrelated owner category, while 
36% fall in the single owner category. Family-owned firms are common in all industries, comprising 
up to 50% of the firms in such industry segments as automotive repair and agriculture, and as little 
as 10% in industry segments such as accounting and advertising. 
                                                            
4 For example, http://names.mongabay.com/male_names.htm. 
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Descriptive statistics 
In this section we present descriptive statistics for the key variables we analyze in our estimation 
sample. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average firm in our sample holds $2.6 
million in total assets, generates $3.7 million in annual sales, has 24 employees, is 12 years old, and 
makes $157 thousand in profits (EBITDA). The median firm has 8 employees and the 90th percentile 
firm has 44 employees. Thus, our dataset predominantly covers very small firms. Return on assets 
(ROA) and profit margin are computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) over total assets, and EBITDA over sales, respectively. Both variables are 
winsorized above and below 2 and -2. Average ROA and profit margin are 0.132 and 0.076 (medians 
of 0.107 and 0.056). On average, firms have leverage ratios (the ratio of debt to assets) just under 
0.75 and liquidity ratios (the ratio of cash to assets) of 0.286. Annual sales growth averages is 0.20.5 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 compares the means across all four ownership categories. Family-owned firms are on 
average larger than non-family-owned firms. For instance, married- and non-married-owners family 
firms have on average 31 and 34 employees, as compared to 21 and 22 employees for unrelated-
owners and single-owner firms. For firms with at least two owners, the average firm has 2.5 owners 
(a median of 2 and a 90th percentile of 4). The distribution of number of owners is similar across 
                                                            
5 The number of observations represented in the panel by family-owned firms is 24.7%, slightly greater than 
the 23% of firms in the sample that are family-owned. This is because family-owned firms have more years of 
observations in the panel compared to non-family-owned firms. One third of the observations are for firms 
with female owners. 
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ownership categories (averages of 2.9, 2.6, and 2.4 for family married-owners, family non-married-
owners and unrelated-owners firms, respectively). 
Married-owners family firms have higher ROA and profit margins than non-married-owners family 
firms (0.175 versus 0.128, and 0.096 versus 0.078). Married-owners family firms also have greater 
liquidity than non-married-owners family firms (0.379 versus 0.290). From the sample averages, it 
does not seem that married-owners family firms have lower sales growth, investment, and leverage 
than non-married-owners family firms. However, these sample averages do not control for firm, 
industry, geographical, and time characteristics. Compared to unrelated-owners and single-owner 
firms, married- and non-married-owners family firms do seem to have greater liquidity and lower 
sales growth, investment and leverage.6 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Estimation methodology 
In this section we empirically examine our four hypotheses in a regression setting using the following 
equation: 
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ity  is a measure of firm behavior or strategy, such as liquidity, leverage, and investment, as well as 
performance, such as sales growth, ROA and profit margin. Unrelated, FamilyNonMarried, and 
FamilyMarried are firm ownership dummies. The base ownership category is single owner. 
                                                            
6 We also compare the pooled averages of family- and non-family-owned firms in our sample and test whether 
the averages are statistically different. We find that family-owned firms, as a group, have higher returns on 
assets and profit margins and are larger than non-family-owned firms. We also find that family-owned firms, as 
a group, invest less, grow slower, and are less leveraged and more liquid. Table A1 in the online appendix 
presents these estimates. 
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FemaleOwner is a dummy that indicates whether the firm has a leading female owner, to 
disentangle the impact of married family ownership from the impact of female ownership. X is a 
vector of control variables (such as lagged sales and firm age). jϕ , cc , and tτ  are complete sets of 
three-digit SIC code, country, and year dummies. itε  is an iid error term. We also include in some 
specifications a dummy for family-owned firms, which receives the value of one for married-owners 
and non-married-owners family firms, and zero for all other firm types. 
In reporting the estimation results, we present p-values for testing different hypotheses on 
parameter equality. In particular, we test whether the family ownership coefficients, β₂ and β₃, are 
jointly equal to the coefficient estimate on unrelated owners, β₁. Due to the panel structure of our 
data, standard errors are clustered by firm.7 
Instrumental Variables. Our estimates are prone to classical unobserved heterogeneity concerns: 
ownership structures may be chosen endogenously based on firm characteristics. For instance, 
family-owned firms may perform better than other types of firms because families are more 
reluctant than other types of shareholders to invest in low-quality projects. To mitigate these 
concerns, we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits geographical variation in divorce 
rates at the regional level (thus, within countries), controlling for region-level factors such as GDP, 
employment rate, geographical size, population size and competitiveness. Firms in our sample span 
a wide set of regions within Europe.8 These regions vary substantially in terms of the prevalence and 
stability of the marriage institution.9 
                                                            
7 To further mitigate concerns that the panel structure of our data affects the statistical significance of our 
estimates, Table A2 in the online appendix presents our main results using cross-sectional data where financial 
information is based on the most recent financial statement for each firm in our sample. 
8 For every country we have information on each city address, and for the majority of firms the region within 
the country. We standardize region names and merge to the two concordance regional OECD tables NUTS-
level3 and NUTS-level2. These codes allow us to merge regional information to our original firm sample. 
9 Summary statistics for region divorce rate are reported in Table 1. Summary statistics for region control 
variables are available from the authors upon request. For instance, the average and median values of GDP 
are, respectively, 30,774 and 29,468 US dollars. The average and median values of employment rate are 0.63 
and 0.65. 
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We combine data from several sources. Data on marriage status comes from the 2005-2008 wave of 
the World Value Survey (WVS).10 The survey provides marital status information. Respondents are 
classified into six categories: married, living together as married, divorced, separated, widowed, and 
single/never married. We aggregate under married the categories married, living together as 
married, and widowed. We aggregate under divorced the categories divorced and separated. In 
addition to marital data, we collect extensive data from OECD and Eurostat on regional development 
(such as GDP, GDP growth, unemployment rate, education level).11 Our final regional data includes 
information on 107 unique regions (with the four countries in our sample), 119,779 firms (with non-
missing lagged sales values), and 489,562 observations. 
Our instrument is the regional divorce rate, which we use as an instrument for whether a firm is a 
married-owners family firm. We expect that in regions in which divorce is more common, we are less 
likely to observe married-owners family firms. This is because the number of married couples should 
be lower, and the expected costs of forming a business with a spouse should be higher when 
partners perceive divorce as more likely. The necessary identifying assumption is that the underlying 
drivers of the divorce rate, such as religious norms or the costs of getting a divorce (monetary or 
psychological), do not impact our firm-level outcome variables other than through the regional 
divorce rate variable, conditional on regional controls. Note that we do not rely on cross-country 
variation in marriage rates, but rather regional variation in these measures since we include country 
fixed effects in all specifications. 
Because the sample for which region information is available is considerably smaller than our full 
sample, to be able to compare the OLS to the IV estimates we also report the OLS results for the 
subsample of firms with region information. 
                                                            
10 http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp. 
11 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics/data/main_tables. To 
measure regional level of competitiveness, we use the European Competitiveness Index by the University of 
Wales Institute. This index combines categories such as creativity, economic performance, infrastructure and 
accessibility, knowledge employment and education. We use the composite index from 2004 and 2006. 
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Estimation results 
Family ownership and conservatism 
We posit in Hypothesis 1 that family-owned firms will exhibit greater conservatism and, in 
Hypothesis 3, that this will especially be true for those firms whose owners are married. Our 
measures of conservatism are firm-level sales growth, cash reserves (liquidity), use of debt 
(leverage), and investment. More conservative behavior is associated with lower sales growth, 
greater liquidity, lower leverage, and lower investment. A greater share of assets held as cash, and 
lower leverage, means that a firm has a cash buffer from which to meet costs or make investments 
without having to rely on the external credit markets for financing. A lower rate of investment 
combined with slower growth may also be associated with a more cautious or conservative 
management approach and business model. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, Table 3 shows that family-owned firms, especially married-owners, 
exhibit significantly lower growth rates, lower investment, higher liquidity and lower leverage. An 
important concern is that the effect of married owners may be driven by the presence of a female 
owner. It is well documented that women are on average more risk averse than men in financial 
decisions (e.g., Levin et al., 1988; Sunden and Surette, 1998). To address this concern, all 
specifications include a female owner dummy. The results show that firms with a female owner 
behave more conservatively in terms of growth, investment, liquidity and leverage. However, the 
effect of married ownership remains significant. 
Columns 1-3 examine sales growth. Column 1 presents the OLS results that show that family-owned 
firms, especially married-owners, experience lower growth rates than unrelated-owners and single-
owner firms. While we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on non-
married and unrelated-owners firms are identical, we strongly reject this hypothesis with respect to 
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married owners. We also reject the hypothesis that family-owned firms experience the same growth 
rates as unrelated-owners firms. The instrumental variable (IV) estimation reveals a very similar 
pattern of results for the smaller sample where region information is available. The IV estimation 
uses a treatment effect model with a Probit model in the first stage.12  Based on the OLS estimates 
(Column 1) and evaluated at the sample average, firms with married owners have sales growth that 
are lower by 12% than sales growth by firms with unrelated owners. Based on the IV estimates 
(Column 3), this figure is 28%.13 
Columns 4-6 present the results for investment. While we find no difference in investment rates 
between non-married-owners family firms and firms with unrelated owners, married-owners family 
firms have lower investment rates than all other ownership types. Evaluated at the sample average, 
married-owners family firms' investment rates are 9% lower than firms with unrelated owners 
(Column 4). The IV estimates implies a slightly higher difference of 13%. 
Family-owned firms rely much less on external finance, keeping greater cash reserves and using less 
debt. Consistent with greater conservatism (Hypothesis 3), Columns 7-12 show that married-owners 
family firms have higher liquidity and lower leverage ratios than all other ownership types. Evaluated 
at the sample average, the OLS estimates imply that married-owners family firms have a liquidity 
ratio that is 15% higher than of firms with unrelated owners (Column 7), and leverage ratios that are 
                                                            
12 Table A3 in the online appendix shows the first-stage regression estimates for the IV results in Tables 3 and 
4. Tables 3 and 4 also report Chi-squared test statistics (i) against the null that divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
first stage and (ii) against the null that it is irrelevant in the second stage. We always reject the null that our 
instrument is irrelevant in the first stage and always accept the null that divorce rate is irrelevant in the second 
stage. 
13 We obtain these estimates by dividing the difference in the estimated coefficients on the married and 
unrelated ownership dummy variables by the dependent variable sample average. 
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lower by 3%.14 The IV estimates yield a higher difference of 23% and 8% for liquidity and leverage 
ratios, respectively.15 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Family ownership and financial performance 
We posit in Hypothesis 2 that family-owned firms will exhibit higher financial performance as 
measured by ROA and profit margins. We posit in Hypothesis 4 that married-owners family firms will 
display higher measures of financial performance compared to non-married-owners family firms. We 
estimate the relationship between firm performance and family ownership in regression (1) 
examined in the previous section. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. The results show that family-owned firms, especially those 
with married owners, tend to outperform non-family-owned firms in terms of higher ROA and profit 
margins. Evaluated at the sample mean for total assets, the OLS estimates imply that a firm with 
married owners has an 18% ROA advantage over unrelated-owners firms (Column 1). The difference 
in ROA may be driven by differences in terms of conservatism. To test this, Column 2 includes our 
measures of conservatism: sales growth, liquidity and leverage. We also control for the number of 
shareholders, because shareholders are likely to vary by ownership type and their number may be 
correlated with financial performance. The ROA advantage of married-owners family firms remains 
                                                            
14 While in percentage terms, leverage differences are small, in dollar terms, married-owners family firms have 
$51,580 less in external debt compared to single-owner and unrelated-owners firms. 
15 Given the small size of many of the firms in our sample, it is also worth comparing estimates evaluated at 
the sample average with estimates evaluated at the sample median. To compute these latter estimates, we 
use the sample median values of our conservatism and financial performance measures reported in Table 1. 
The size of the effects is similar for all conservatism and financial performance measures, except sales growth. 
For instance, the OLS estimates evaluated at the sample median imply that married-owners family firms have a 
liquidity ratio that is 20% higher than of firms with unrelated owners, and leverage ratios that are lower by 3%. 
However, for sales growth, the difference is lower by 24%, as opposed to just 12% for the OLS estimates 
evaluated at the sample average. 
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significant (9% over unrelated-owners firms), which implies that the financial advantage of married 
owners is not likely to be driven exclusively by varying levels of conservatism. Columns 3-4 present 
the IV results, which yield similar advantages for married-owners family firms (10% and 13%, 
respectively). 
Columns 5-8 present the analysis for profit margins. Relative to the sample average, the OLS 
estimates imply that married-owners family firms enjoy 12% higher margins than firms with 
unrelated owners (Column 6), and the IV estimates indicate 21% higher margins (Column 8). As in 
Table 3, all specifications include a female owner dummy. The presence of a female owner has a 
positive effect on both firm ROA and profitability, but does not alter the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the married-owners dummies. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Classification of married owners. Our findings may be sensitive to measurement error in classifying 
family-owned firms into married versus non-married. To address this concern, we perform two types 
of analyses. First, we classify family-owned firms as "must be married" only if the names are in the 
format "Mr. and Mrs. Smith" (e.g., Mr. John Smith is one shareholder and another shareholder is 
Mrs. John Smith or Mrs. Mary Smith), and if the age difference between the two is less than 15 
years. Second, we use information at the regional level on the percentage of married women that 
take the last name of their husband. We then exclude firms that are located in regions where the 
percentage of women who answer "Yes" to the question "Do you always use your husband's last 
name?" is below the sample's first quartile (68 percent).16 Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation 
results. The results are robust to alternative definitions of married owners. 
                                                            
16 The source of information is the 1995 version of the Eurobarometer survey. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
Within-firm ownership changes 
Our data is a large panel of over 200,000 firms spanning 10 years. The analysis so far has relied on 
cross-sectional differences between firms with different ownership types. In this section we examine 
whether the relationship between family ownership and firm strategy and performance also holds 
specifically within firms that experience ownership changes. Such analysis holds constant 
unobservable firm characteristics that do not vary over time by differencing the dependent and 
independent variables. Thus, in this section, the variation used to produce our estimates comes from 
within-firm variation. 
We explore variation in the number and nature of ownership changes across family-owned and non-
family-owned firms using a new extraction of the Amadeus database for 2012, which provides 
detailed ownership information for the Amadeus universe for 2011. Ownership data are cross-
sectional and thus we need to rely on multiple publications of Amadeus to learn about ownership 
changes. Firms in our original 2007 extraction and the 2012 extraction are linked through an 
identifier number, which makes linking the two publications by firms straightforward. However, the 
shareholders of each firm do not have unique identification numbers. Therefore, in order to 
determine whether an owner has changed between 2007 and 2011 we need first to create a unique 
identification number for all owners in our data over time. Using automated algorithms and manual 
checks (the algorithm is available upon request) we assign a unique id to each owner. We then use 
this identification number to track changes in owners within firms over time. There are 82,707 firms 
that appear in the 2007 and 2012 publications with ownership and financial information. We use this 
sample to estimate the effect of ownership changes on firm performance and behavior. We say that 
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an ownership change has occurred when the leading owner in 2007 is different from the leading 
owner in 2011. We focus on three types of ownership changes: from married-owners to unrelated 
owners, from non-married family to unrelated owners, and from unrelated owners to different 
unrelated owners. For other types of ownership changes, we did not find enough cases to warrant a 
systematic analysis of their effects. First, we compare how ownership changes in the period 2007-
2011 are related to ownership structure in 2007. 8,633 firms changed their leading owner within this 
time period. Of those firms, 29% are married-owners family firms, 24% are non-married-owners 
family firms, and the remaining 47% are firms with unrelated owners. Next, we estimate the effect 
of these ownership changes on return on assets, sales growth and investment. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results. Columns 1-3 present the estimation results for firms that 
changed ownership from married owners in 2007 to unrelated owners in 2011. In Column 1 the 
dependent variable is the change in growth rates between 2011 and 2007, in Column 2 the 
dependent variable is the change in investment between the two periods, and in Column 3 the 
dependent variable is the change in returns on assets for the same periods. The results are 
consistent with our previous findings. As firms transition away from married-owners, they become 
less profitable but grow faster and increase their investment. For instance, when married-owners 
family firms transition to unrelated owners, ROA drops by 2.9 percentage points. When we examine 
ownership changes from non-married family to unrelated owners in Columns 4-6, we see that sales 
growth and investment are unaffected, but ROA increases by 3.2 percentage points. We find similar 
results in Columns 7-9 when we examine ownership changes from unrelated owners to another set 
of unrelated owners. 
Overall, these results highlight the dominant role of marital ties in driving differences in firm 
financial performance, growth and investment. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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Ownership concentration 
Family owners may behave more conservatively than unrelated owners as a result of greater 
concentration of family assets in the firm. Risk aversion could also potentially explain the superior 
financial performance of family-owned firms if family owners require a larger rate of return to start a 
business. 
Table 8 examines whether the results above are driven by ownership concentration at the family 
level. We restrict attention to firms owned by multiple shareholders and control for the share of 
equity held by the firm's dominant shareholders.17 For each firm, we aggregate equity holdings at 
the surname level and include this variable as a control. We expect ownership concentration at the 
family level to be positively related to our measures of conservatism and financial performance. 
However, to the extent that owners' logics (values, preferences, interpretative schemes) also matter, 
we expect the effect of the family ownership categories to be robust. 
Columns 1-4 present the estimation results for sales growth. Ownership concentration by dominant 
family shareholders is as expected associated with slower growth (Column 2), but the coefficient on 
married family owners remains negative and significant even after controlling for equity holdings 
(Column 4). The coefficient on non-married family owners, however, becomes insignificant. Columns 
5-8 present the estimation results for investment. The same pattern of results emerges, but, 
interestingly, ownership concentration at the family level is associated with greater investment, not 
less. Columns 9-12 present the estimation results for ROA. In that case, the effect of non-married 
family owners, while smaller than that of married owners, remains significant. 
To summarize, the results indicate that married family ownership is an important driver of firm 
performance and behavior, even after controlling for ownership concentration at the family level. 
                                                            
17 By definition, single owners own 100% of their firm's equity. Thus, the results in Tables 3 and 4 that family-
owned firms behave more conservatively and perform better than single-owner firms cannot be explained by 
greater ownership concentration in family-owned firms. 
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The effect of non-married family ownership is less significant, especially as far as conservatism is 
concerned. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Wage costs 
We examine a potential mechanism that may drive the observed higher profit margins and ROA of 
family-owned firms: wage costs. The literature suggests that, because family-owned firms provide 
greater employment security to their workers, they tend to have lower employment costs (Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2007). 
Table 9 presents the estimation results. The results show that family-owned firms, especially those 
with married owners, have lower employment costs. Column 1 includes a dummy variable for family-
owned firms. Evaluated at the sample mean, wages are $9,000 less per employee compared to non-
family-owned firms. Column 2 includes dummies for married- and non-married-owners family firms. 
The coefficient estimates on firms with married and non-married family owners are negative and 
statistically different from single-owner and unrelated-owners firms. Column 3 adds the female 
owner dummy but its coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. Column 4 presents the IV 
results, which are much larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. Married-owners family firms 
have the lowest wages---28% lower than unrelated-owners firms and 19% lower than firms with 
non-married family owners. Columns 5 and 6 show that these differences are not driven by very 
young firms or firms with a very small number of employees. These results mitigate the concern that 
lower employment costs may be driven by owner compensation: owner compensation should not 
greatly affect average wage as the number of employees grows larger. Overall, the results indicate 
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that an important reason why family-owned firms, particularly married-owners family firms, have 
higher ROA and profit margins is that they are able to pay lower wages to their employees. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Additional results and robustness tests 
In this section we discuss a number of additional findings and robustness tests to the paper's main 
results. The full set of results is available in the online appendix. 
Firm Survival. Firms that are profitable are not likely to be terminated and conservative cash and 
investment policies plausibly also reduce the risk of failure. Thus, we expect family-owned firms, and 
especially married-owners family firms, to exhibit higher survival rates. 
Table 10 examines the relationship between firm survival and ownership type. Column 1 shows that 
married-owners family firms are less likely to fail than non-married owners family firms (hazard 
ratios of 0.853 and 0.899) and that both married- and non-married-owners family firms are less likely 
to fail than unrelated-owners firms and single-owner firms. We control for firm ROA, liquidity and 
leverage in Column 2 and continue to find the same pattern of results. Column 3 excludes single 
owners. Family-owned firms are still less likely to fail than unrelated-owners firms and married-
owners family firms are still less likely to fail than non-married-owners family firms; however, the 
statistical significance of the latter result is diminished. Columns 4 to 7 show that our findings are, as 
expected, mostly driven by younger firms, which have the highest failure rates. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
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Subsamples of firm age and size. We examine whether our main findings are robust to restricting 
the estimation sample by firm age and firm size. Married owners may disproportionately be firm 
founders, which may explain their superior performance. Restricting the sample to young firms, 
where all owners are likely to be founders, mitigates this concern. Table A4 in the online appendix 
presents the estimation results for our regressions of sales growth, investment and ROA by firm age. 
For each dependent variable, we estimate the regression on firms at or under the median age of 9 
years and separately again on firms older than 9 years. We find that for all three dependent 
variables---sales growth, investment, and ROA---the impact of married family ownership is stronger 
in younger firms. This suggests that the effect of married owners is not mainly driven by a firm 
founder effect. We also split the sample based on employment size. We estimate the regressions for 
firms with 8 (the sample median) or fewer employees, and separately again for firms with more than 
8 employees. We find that our estimates are similar in the samples of both large and small firms. 
Family management. It is possible that the family ownership effect we estimate is in fact a family 
management effect. In Appendix Table A5, we examine whether our family ownership effects are 
robust to controlling for whether at least one of the managers in the firm is also a family member. In 
addition to controlling for the presence of a family manager, we also control for the manager's 
equity stake. A higher manager equity stake may lead to more conservative behavior and higher 
performance due to a greater portion of the managers’ wealth being dependent on the firm. We find 
that our results are robust in all cases. Interestingly, while we find, as expected, that a greater 
manager's equity stake also leads to more conservative behavior, we do not find that the presence 
of a family manager does so. We find that a family manager is associated with higher ROA, profit 
margin and sales growth, and no effect on liquidity, leverage, and investment. 
Differential tax treatment of family firms. In Appendix Table A6 regressions, we also examine 
whether the higher ROA and profitability of family-owned firms may be due to differences in tax 
rates. We control for a country's difference in the top personal and top corporate income tax rates, 
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to see whether the family ownership effect on ROA and profits is due to greater ability to avoid 
paying the higher tax rate. We find that, when the personal tax rate is higher than the corporate tax 
rate, firms have higher profit margins, though the effect is not statistically significant. The family 
ownership effect is unchanged by the inclusion of the tax rate difference control. 
 
Discussion 
The literature on the "family effect" on firm performance has yielded mixed or conflicting results, 
with some studies suggesting a positive effect and other studies suggesting a negative effect. An 
important reason for these conflicting results has been the heterogeneity of datasets, performance 
measures and empirical approaches adopted. Researchers have used different definitions of family 
firms, have often aggregated firms run by different generations of family owners, and have generally 
not distinguished between lone, or single, owners and broader family involvement in a business. In 
addition, several performance measures have been used, but these measures (e.g., profitability 
versus growth) may be differentially affected by owners' strategic orientations. 
The present paper helps address these issues. We examine how the social context of ownership 
affects firm strategy and performance. We distinguish among firms owned by multiple unrelated 
individuals, firms owned by multiple family-related individuals ("family owners"), and firms owned 
by a single individual ("single owner"). Within family-owned firms, we further distinguish between 
firms that are predominantly owned by a married couple and firms that are predominantly owned 
by other types of family members, such as parents and children or siblings. 
Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that family 
owners will predominantly be concerned with providing stable, secure income to family members. 
Married owners, in particular, may come to perceive their firm as a legacy or bequest to their 
children. This `familiar logic' of family owners can be a source of comparative advantage---it can 
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motivate family owners to work hard---but can also discourage risk taking, thus dampening growth. 
Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that family-owned firms earn significantly higher returns 
on assets and higher profit margins than non-family-owned firms, and also exhibit higher survival 
rates. These effects are partly driven by the ability or willingness of family owners to keep cash 
within the firm and to keep operating costs low (in particular wage costs). However, family 
ownership is also associated with lower investment and slower growth, especially when firms are 
young. Thus, the familiar logic of family owners appears to bring with it both costs and benefits. 
The results for conservatism and to a lesser extent those for financial performance are driven by 
firms whose two largest shareholders are married. In particular, the effect of non-married family 
owners on conservatism becomes insignificant when ownership concentration is controlled for and 
in the ownership change regressions. This indicates that Hypothesis 1 does not hold independent of 
Hypothesis 3. (By contrast, the effect of non-married family owners on financial performance is 
robust.) There are significant differences in how different types of family owners manage their firms. 
Thus, when theorizing on "family" effects in family-owned firms, finer distinctions among different 
types of owners and performance measures may be necessary. 
By highlighting the importance of marital ties, the paper underscores the role of rituals and symbols 
in the emergence of institutional logics. Institutional logics researchers have identified a number of 
factors that can bring about changes in logics, such as cultural factors (Lounsbury and Crumley, 
2007), powerful actors such as the state or the profession (Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Lounsbury, 2002), and key individuals (Thornton et al., 2012). Rituals and symbols can also 
facilitate the emergence of new logics. As Friedland and Alford (1991: 232) note, institutions are not 
just "patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space" but 
also "symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with meaning." Our 
results suggest that marriage is a ritual that induces people to re-evaluate their priorities and social 
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identities. It marks the transition between the entrepreneurial, growth-oriented logic of lone owners 
to the more conservative logic of family owners. 
The present paper also informs agency-theoretic views of the firm. We find little support for the 
argument that family-owned firms perform better and are more likely to survive because there are 
fewer conflicts of interest between owners or better monitoring between owners and managers. 
Indeed, family-owned firms perform better in terms of profits, returns and survival than firms owned 
by a single individual, where ownership and managerial responsibilities often coincide. 
The present paper also complements existing research on family firms by providing better coverage 
of small firms than usually available. Most firms in our dataset are very small---the median firm in 
our sample has just 8 employees, and the 90th percentile firm has 44. For the owners of these very 
small firms, providing a stable, secure income to other family members is likely to be a major 
concern. Large publicly listed family firms, by contrast, are likely to be owned by wealthy individuals 
who may not place the same value on income security as small business owners. Thus, research 
focusing on large, often public family firms may have downplayed some important motivations of 
family owners. 
Our analysis controls for several potential confounding factors. It is possible, for instance, that family 
owners and especially married ones behave more conservatively than other types of owners 
because their wealth is less diversified. We find that ownership concentration computed at the 
family level is indeed associated with conservatism; however, the effect of married ownership 
remains strong. This suggests that it is not just ownership or wealth concentration that matters, but 
also who the owners are, and what their priorities are (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Yin and Zajac, 2004; 
Miller et al., 2010). 
Gender differences in ability or risk-taking may also confound our results. Female owners may at the 
same time be more capable and more risk averse than their male counterparts. Our results are 
robust to controlling for female ownership. Moreover, married owners may be drawn 
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disproportionately from the population of firm founders, and founders may on average be abler, and 
perhaps also more risk-averse, than second- or third-generation owners. We mitigate this concern 
by showing that our results also hold in a subsample of young firms, where all owners are likely to be 
firm founders. 
A limitation of our analysis is that we classify owners as married or not married using empirical 
strategies based on data on owners' surnames, sex, age, titles, country-level propensity of married 
women to assume the husband's surname, etcetera. These strategies are imperfect and we cannot 
exclude misclassification errors (which, however, would bias our estimates against finding any 
differences between ownership structures). Collecting more detailed personal data on owners is an 
important task to make progress in this area. 
Another limitation of our analysis concerns the extent to which our results can be interpreted 
causally. One interpretation of our results is that ownership by a married couple causes more 
conservative management strategies and other differences in strategic behavior that leads to higher 
financial performance and survival rates. Another interpretation is that married couples select 
business opportunities that are less risky and have higher profit potential. Our instrumental variables 
estimation, and to some extent our within firm ownership change analysis, suggests that the 
selection interpretation is not the whole story, although it likely explains some of the identified 
correlation between married family ownership and firm behavior. Under either interpretation, our 
results suggest that married couples disproportionately care about owning less risky firms and ones 
that exhibit higher performance, whether they actively cause these outcomes or simply choose to 
start firms with these underlying characteristics. 
 
Conclusion 
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Family firms operate at the intersection of two fundamental human spheres: the family and the 
business. Despite the growing interest in family firms, very little is known about the family side of 
the equation. Using a large panel of private European firms, this paper explores how the social 
context of ownership---the types of affective ties that exist between shareholders---influence 
corporate strategy and performance. We show that family owners select and manage very different 
types of firms relative to single individuals or unrelated owners. Specifically, we find evidence of a 
trade-off to family ownership, in which family-owned firms are managed more conservatively, 
increasing profits, liquidity and survival, but diminishing investment and growth. This trade-off can 
be seen as the manifestation of a `familiar logic'---a logic that enhances commitment to the firm by 
family owners, but also prioritizes the preservation of wealth over growth. 
The familiar logic of family owners is most pronounced among married owners. As stressed by 
embeddedness theorists, logics vary with social context, depending on the nature and strength of 
social ties (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Married owners may both work harder and behave 
more conservatively than other types of family and non-family shareholders because they are more 
concerned with the welfare of future generations, and therefore with the long-term performance 
and survival of the firm. These motivations are likely to be most important for small business 
owners, on which our analysis focuses. Overall, our results suggest that it may be misleading to talk 
about "family effects" on firm strategy and performance. The strength of affective ties varies also 
within the family. Deconstructing the concept of "family" in family-owned firms may enable a better 
understanding of how these important institutions operate. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: We thank two anonymous referees and the Editor, Constance 
Helfat, for very constructive comments that substantially improved the paper. We also 
grateful to Mark Schankerman, William Schulze, David Sraer, Margarita Tsoutroura, Belen 
Villalonga, seminar participants at several universities, and especially Ashish Arora for 
helpful comments and suggestions. The analysis and conclusions presented in this paper are 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
those of the authors and do not necessarily indicate concurrence by members of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors or its staff. 
 
References 
Anderson RC, Reeb DM. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the 
S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58(3): 1301-1328. 
Bantel KA, Jackson SE. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: does the composition of 
the top team make a difference? Strategic Management Journal 10(S1): 107-124. 
Beatty R, Zajac E. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: a study of executive 
compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 39(2): 313-335. 
Berrone P, Cruz C, Gomez-Mejia LR. 2012. Socioemotional wealth in family firms: theoretical 
dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review 25(3): 
258-279. 
Bertrand M, Schoar A. 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
20(2): 73-96. 
Block JH. 2012. R&D investments in family and founder firms: an agency perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing 27(2): 248-265. 
Bloom N, Van Reenen J. 2007. Measuring and explaining management practices across firms and 
countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4): 1351-1408. 
Carpenter M. 2002. The implications of strategy and social context for the relationship between top 
management team heterogeneity and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 23(3): 275-
284. 
Chrisman JJ, Chua JH, Steier L. 2005. Sources and consequences of distinctive familiness: an 
introduction. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 29(3): 237-247. 
Chua JH, Chrisman JJ, Sharma P. 1999. Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice 23(4): 19-39. 
Chung C-N, Luo XR. 2013. Leadership succession and firm performance in an emerging economy: 
successor origin, relational embeddedness, and legitimacy. Strategic Management Journal 34(3): 
338-357. 
Colli A. 2002. The History of Family Business, 1850-2000. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Dawkins R. 2006. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Dyer WG Jr. 2006. Examining the "family effect" on firm performance. Family Business Review 19(4): 
253-273. 
Eisenhardt KM. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management Review 
14(1): 57-74. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
Eller JD. 2009. Cultural Anthropology: Global Forces, Local Lives. Routledge: New York. 
Feldman ER, Amit R, Villalonga B. 2014. Corporate divestitures and family control. Strategic 
Management Journal forthcoming. 
Fiss PC, Zajac EJ. 2004. The diffusion of ideas over contested terrain: the (non) adoption of a 
shareholder value orientation among German firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 49(4): 501-
534. 
Friedland R, Alford RR. 1991. Bringing society back in: symbols, practices, and institutional 
contradictions. In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Powell WW, DiMaggio PJ 
(eds). University of Chicago: Chicago, IL: 232-265. 
Gallo MA, Tapies J, Cappuyns K. 2004. Comparison of family and nonfamily business: financial logic 
and personal preferences. Family Business Review 17(4): 303-318. 
Garud R, Jain S, Kumaraswamy A. 2002. Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of 
common technological standards: the case of Sun Microsystems and Java. Academy of Management 
Journal 45(1): 196-214. 
Gersick KE, Davis JA, Hampton MM, Lansberg I. 1997. Generation to Generation: Life Cycles of the 
Family Business. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA. 
Gomez-Mejia LR, Nunez-Nickel M, Gutierrez I. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. 
Academy of Management Journal 44(1): 81-95. 
Gomez-Mejia LR, Takacs Haynes K, Nunez-Nickel M, Jacobson KJL, Moyano-Fuentes J. 2007. 
Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: evidence from Spanish olive oil 
mills. Administrative Science Quarterly 52(1): 106-137. 
Granovetter M. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360-1380. 
Granovetter M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481-510. 
Greenwood R, Deephouse DL, Xiao Li S. 2007. Ownership and performance of professional service 
firms. Organization Studies 28(2): 219-238. 
Greenwood R, Diaz AM, Xiao Li S, Cespedes Lorente J. 2010. The multiplicity of institutional logics 
and the heterogeneity of organizational responses. Organization Science 21(2): 521-539. 
Greenwood R, Suddaby R, Hinings CR. 2002. Theorizing change: The role of professional associations 
in the transformation of institutional fields. Academy of Management Journal 45(1): 58-80. 
Jensen MC, Meckling W. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. 
Karra N, Tracey P, Phillips N. 2006. Altruism and agency in the family firm: exploring the role of 
family, kinship, and ethnicity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 30(6): 861-877. 
Leach P. 2007. Family Businesses: The Essentials. Profile Books: London. 
Le Breton-Miller I, Miller D. 2009. Agency vs. stewardship in public family firms: a social 
embeddedness reconciliation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 33(6): 1169-1191. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
Le Breton-Miller I, Miller D, Lester RH. 2011. Stewardship or agency? a social embeddedness 
reconciliation of conduct and performance in public family businesses. Organization Science 22(3): 
704-721. 
Levin IP, Snyder MA, Chapman DP. The interaction of experiential and situational factors and gender 
in a simulated risky decision-making task. Journal of Psychology 122(2): 173-181. 
Levi-Strauss C. 1969. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Beacon Press: Boston, MA. 
Lounsbury M. 2002. Institutional transformation and status mobility: the professionalization of the 
field of finance. Academy of Management Journal 45(1): 255-266. 
Lounsbury M. 2007. A tale of two cities: competing logics and practice variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal 50(2): 289-307. 
Lounsbury M, Crumley ET. 2007. New practice creation: an institutional perspective on innovation. 
Organization Studies 28(7): 993-1012. 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH. 2010, Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly-
traded companies. Strategic Management Journal 31(2): 201-223. 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH. 2011. Family and lone founder ownership and strategic 
behaviour: social context, identity, and institutional logics. Journal of Management Studies 48(1): 1-
25. 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH. 2013. Family firm governance, strategic conformity, and 
performance: institutional vs. strategic perspectives. Organization Science 24(1): 189-209. 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH, Cannella AAJr. 2007. Are family firms really superior 
performers? Journal of Corporate Finance 13(5): 829-858. 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Scholnick B. 2008. Stewardship vs. stagnation: an empirical comparison 
of small family and non-family businesses. Journal of Management Studies 45(1): 51-78. 
Miller D, Minichilli A, Corbetta G. 2013. Is family leadership always beneficial? Strategic 
Management Journal 34(5): 553-571. 
Minichilli A, Corbetta G, MacMillan IC. 2010. Top management teams in family-controlled 
companies: `familiness', `faultiness', and their impact on financial performance. Journal of 
Management Studies 47(2): 205-222. 
Mishra CS, McConaughy DL. 1999. Founding family control and capital structure: the risk of loss of 
control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 23(4): 53-65. 
Ocasio W. 1997. Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 18(S1): 
187-206. 
Parker SC. 2008. Entrepreneurship among married couples in the United States: a simultaneous 
probit approach. Labour Economics 15(3): 459-481. 
Patel PC, Chrisman JJ. 2014. Risk abatement as a strategy for R&D investments in family firms. 
Strategic Management Journal 35(4): 617-627. 
Peredo AM. 2003. Nothing thicker than blood: commentary on "Help one another, use one another: 
toward an anthropology of family business." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 27(4): 397-400. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
Perez-Gonzalez F. 2006. Inherited control and firm performance. American Economic Review 96(5): 
1559-1588. 
Rumelt RP. 1991. How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal 12(3): 167-185. 
Sraer D, Thesmar D. 2007. The performance and behavior of family-owned firms: evidence from the 
French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association 5(4): 709-751. 
Sunden AE, Surette BJ. 1998. Gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement savings 
plans. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 88(2): 207-211. 
Stewart A. 2003. Help one another, use one another: toward an anthropology of family business. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 27(4): 383-396. 
Thornton PH. 2004. Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational Decisions in Higher 
Education Publishing. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA. 
Thornton PH, Ocasio W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in 
organizations: executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990. 
American Journal of Sociology 105(3): 801-843. 
Thornton PH, Ocasio W. 2008. Institutional logics. In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism, Greenwood R, Oliver C, Sahlin K, Suddaby R (eds). Sage: Los Angeles, CA: 99-129. 
Thornton PH, Ocasio W, Lounsbury M. 2012. Institutional Logics Perspective: A New Approach to 
Culture, Structure, and Process. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Uzzi B. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of 
organizations: the network effect. American Sociological Review 61(4): 674--698. 
Uzzi B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox of embeddedness. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1): 35--68. 
Uzzi B, Gillespie JJ. 2002. Knowledge spillover in corporate financing networks: embeddedness and 
the firm's debt performance. Strategic Management Journal 23(7): 595-618. 
Villalonga B, Amit R. 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? 
Journal of Financial Economics 80(2): 385-417. 
Walter SG, Heinrichs S, Walter A. 2014. Parent hostility and spin-out performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 35(13): 2031-2042. 
Westphal JD, Zajac EJ. 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEO's long-term incentive plans. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 39(3): 367--390. 
Wiseman RM, Gomez-Mejia LR. 1998. A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. Academy 
of Management Review 23(1): 133-153. 
Wong YC. 1986. Entrepreneurship, marriage, and earnings. Review of Economics and Statistics 68(4): 
693-699. 
Xia F, Walker G. 2015. How much does owner type matter for firm performance? Manufacturing 
firms in China 1998-2007. Strategic Management Journal 36(4): 576-585. 
Yin X, Zajac E. 2004. The strategy/governance fit relationship: theory and evidence in franchising 
arrangements. Strategic Management Journal 25(4): 365-383. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
Variable Obs. Firms Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
Dummy for Family Owners 1,258,172 228,253 0.247 0.431 0 0 1
Dummy for Married Family Owners 1,258,172 228,253 0.094 0.292 0 0 1
Dummy for Non-Married Family Owners 1,258,172 228,253 0.152 0.359 0 0 1
Dummy for Unrelated Owners 1,258,172 228,253 0.421 0.494 0 0 1
Dummy for Single Owner 1,258,172 228,253 0.333 0.471 0 0 1
Dummy for Female Owner 1,258,172 228,253 0.321 0.467 0 0 1
Sales Growth 1,244,008 226,723 0.200 0.538 -0.198 0.101 0.626
Liquidity 1,078,368 217,003 0.286 0.569 0.038 0.212 0.655
Leverage 1,230,284 227,449 0.749 0.341 0.383 0.753 0.990
Investment 1,258,012 228,233 0.137 0.401 -0.222 0.101 0.536
Returns on Assets 1,254,515 227,758 0.132 0.210 -0.003 0.107 0.317
Profit Margin 1,256,696 228,216 0.076 0.140 -0.001 0.056 0.194
Assets  ($,'000) 1,258,172 228,253 2,579 43,882 91 457 3,892
Sales  ($,'000) 1,258,172 228,253 3,740 53,126 199 842 6,104
EBITDA  ($,'000) 1,258,164 228,252 157 2,657 -13 31 294
Firm Age 1,258,172 228,253 12 23.2 2 9 25
Year of Incorporation 1,258,172 228,253 1990 9.4 1978 1993 2000
Number of Employees 750,815 180,979 24 111 2 8 44
Wage per Employee ($,'000) 748,159 180,138 36 888 14 27 51
Number of Shareholders 1,258,172 228,253 2 1 1 2 3
Region Divorce Rate 1,109,312 201,653 0.069 0.036 0.022 0.065 0.121
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Distribution
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the econometric analysis. Return on Assets is EBITDA over
Assets. Profit Margin is EBITDA over Sales. Sales Growth is the annual change in log sales. Investment is the annual change in log total
assets. Firm Age is years from date of incorporation. Liquidity is cash over Assets . Leverage is the sum of current and non-current
liabilities over Assets . For detailed definitions of ownership types, Single Owner, Family Owners, Married Family Owners, Non-Married
Family Owners and Unrelated Owners, please see Section 3 of the paper.   
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Ac
c
e
p
t
e
d
 
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
Variable # Obs. Mean Median # Obs. Mean Median # Obs. Mean Median # Obs. Mean Median
Sales Growth 117,487 0.171 0.087 190,223 0.155 0.084 523,991 0.198 0.103 412,307 0.231 0.112
Investment 118,497 0.116 0.087 191,670 0.113 0.088 529,025 0.134 0.101 418,820 0.158 0.112
Liquidity 104,360 0.379 0.239 168,849 0.290 0.203 453,985 0.290 0.209 351,174 0.300 0.213
Leverage 116,822 0.723 0.727 187,697 0.708 0.715 519,045 0.757 0.758 406,720 0.765 0.771
Returns on Assets 117,678 0.175 0.120 191,239 0.128 0.103 527,949 0.127 0.106 417,649 0.128 0.107
Profit Margin 118,397 0.096 0.065 191,478 0.078 0.056 528,606 0.072 0.054 418,215 0.075 0.057
Assets  ($,'000) 118,513 2,888 454 191,679 3,465 667 529,096 2,128 438 418,884 2,656 410
Sales  ($,'000) 118,513 4,078 847 191,679 5,221 1145 529,096 3,329 838 418,884 3,487 745
EBITDA  ($,'000) 118,513 289 62 191,679 328 69 529,096 207 48 418,884 235 44
Firm Age 118,513 13.8 10 191,679 16.5 13 529,096 11.7 9 418,884 10.5 8
Year of Incorporation 118,513 1988.8 1992 191,679 1985.8 1989 529,096 1990.6 1993 418,884 1991.9 1994
Number of Employees 58,810 30.8 9 118,211 34.3 11 322,237 20.9 8 251,557 22.1 7
Number of Shareholders 116,822 2.95 3 187,697 2.62 2 519,045 2.41 2 1 1 1
Notes: This table reports summary statistics by ownership type. Return on Assets  is EBITDA  over Assets . Profit Margin  is EBITDA  over Sales . Sales Growth  is the annual change in log 
sales. Investment  is the annual change in log total assets. Firm age  is years from date of incorporation. Liquidity  is cash over Assets . Leverage  is the sum of current and non-current 
liabilities over Assets . For detailed definitions of ownerhip types, please see Section 3 of the paper.   
Table 2.  Firm Characteristics by Ownership Type
Family-Owned Non-Family-Owned
Married Owners Non-Married Owners Unrelated Owners Single Owner
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable:
Full 
sample
Full 
sample
Full 
sample
Full 
sample
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners -0.028** -0.041** -0.060** -0.016** -0.014** -0.018** 0.035** 0.083** 0.100** -0.023** -0.034** -0.065**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married 
Family Owners -0.006** -0.019** -0.018** -0.004** -0.006** -0.006** 0.009** 0.038** 0.038** -0.019** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated Owners -0.004** Base Base -0.004** Base Base -0.007** Base Base -0.002 Base Base
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Dummy for Female Owner -0.018** -0.024** -0.023** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** 0.015** 0.034** 0.033** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Sales )t-1 -0.095** -0.098** -0.099** -0.041** -0.043** -0.043** -0.035** -0.065** -0.065** -0.020** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Age  (×10) -0.042** -0.121** -0.121** -0.027** -0.065** -0.065** -0.010** -0.046** -0.050** -0.049** -0.078** -0.078**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
First stage (Dummy for Married 
Owners ):
Region Divorce Rate -1.630** -1.623** -1.611** -1.640**
(0.328) (0.327) (0.339) (0.327)
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the first-
stage: 35.33** 36.12** 34.89** 36.59**
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p>0.10 p>0.10 p<0.01
(b)=(c) p=0.07 p<0.01 p<0.01 p>0.10 p<0.01 p>0.10 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
second stage: 0.01 0.12 0.36 2.54
Sample average: 0.200 0.214 0.214 0.137 0.135 0.135 0.286 0.424 0.424 0.749 0.766 0.766
R2 0.133 0.128 - 0.120 0.097 - 0.126 0.152 - 0.060 0.052 -
Observations 1,258,172 218,505 218,505 1,258,012 221,018 221,018 1,078,368 192,880 192,880 1,230,284 219,747 219,747
Investment
Table 3. Family Ownership and Conservatism
Notes:  This table examines the relationship between family ownership and measures of conservatism. In Columns 3, 6 and 12 Dummy for Married Owners  is 
instrumented by region divorce rate using a treatment effects model. Region controls include GDP, employment rate, geographical size, population size and 
competitiveness index. The full sample includes 272 three-digit SIC code dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow 
for serial correlation through clustering by firms. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
IV sample IV sample IV sampleIV sample
Sales growth Liquidity Leverage
This article is protected by c pyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners 0.025** 0.021** 0.019** 0.024** 0.014** 0.011** 0.013** 0.019**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married Family 
Owners 0.006** 0.008** 0.005* 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated Owners 0.001 0.009** Base Base -0.001 0.002* Base Base
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy for Female Owner 0.008** 0.003** 0.012** 0.011** 0.003** 0.001 0.005** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.033** 0.037** 0.037** 0.013** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity 0.370** 0.426** 0.426** 0.133** 0.143** 0.141**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage -0.037** -0.022** -0.021** -0.061** -0.055** -0.055**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Number of Shareholders) -0.007** -0.009** -0.008** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Sales )t-1 -0.004** 0.006** 0.003** 0.003** -0.005** -0.003** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age  (×10) -0.018** -0.016** -0.033** -0.033** -0.002** -0.003** -0.009** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
First stage (Dummmy for Married 
Owners ):
Region Divorce Rate -1.582** -1.619**
(0.342) (0.341)
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the first-
stage: 29.91** 32.86**
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(b)=(c) p<0.01 p>0.10 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
second stage: 0.22 0.01
Sample average: 0.132 0.132 0.186 0.186 0.076 0.076 0.092 0.092
R2 0.072 0.514 0.597 - 0.081 0.272 0.338 -
Observations 1,254,515 1,071,051 191,004 191,004 1,256,696 1,071,051 192,240 192,240
Notes:  This table examines the relationship between family ownership and return on assets (EBITDA  over assets ) and 
profit margin (EBITDA  over Sales ).  In Columns 4 and 8,  Dummy for Married Owners is instrumented by region divorce 
rate using a treatment effects model. Region controls include GDP, employment rate, geographical size, population size and 
competitiveness index. The full sample includes 272 three-digit SIC code dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. * and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
Profit Margin 
Table 4. Family Ownership and Financial Performance
Return on Assets
Full sample IV sample Full sample IV sample
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Dependent variable:
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners -0.037** -0.055** -0.025** -0.076** -0.021** -0.025** -0.008** -0.025** 0.078** 0.122** 0.051** 0.117** -0.059** -0.055** -0.018** -0.068**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.008)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married 
Family Owners -0.027** -0.030** 0.002 -0.019** -0.018** -0.011** 0.004** -0.006* 0.017** 0.059** 0.017** 0.041** -0.034** -0.030** -0.013** -0.031**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated 
Owners -0.007** Base 0.014** Base -0.007** Base 0.010** Base -0.006** Base -0.010** Base -0.005** Base 0.011** Base
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Sales )t-1 -0.103** -0.098** -0.080** -0.100** -0.046** -0.042** -0.032** -0.044** -0.037** -0.066** -0.051** -0.069** -0.030** -0.028** -0.019** -0.029**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Firm Age  (×10) -0.008** -0.120** -0.036** -0.121** -0.005** -0.065** -0.021** -0.064** -0.002** -0.047** -0.014** -0.055** -0.009** -0.078** -0.042** -0.080**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
First stage (Dummmy for 
Married Owners ):
Region divorce rate -1.890** -2.340** -1.911** -2.331** -1.977** -2.349** -1.917** -2.339**
(0.701) (0.330) (0.697) (0.329) (0.698) (0.340) (0.699) (0.329)
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
first-stage: 35.33** 52.77** 36.12** 55.04** 34.89** 53.58** 36.59** 55.66**
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p>0.10 p<0.01
(b)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.10 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
second stage: - 0.06 - 1.88 - 0.07 0.80 - 0.57 0.01 2.08 2.41
Sample average: 0.200 0.214 0.188 0.218 0.137 0.135 0.120 0.137 0.286 0.424 0.361 0.443 0.749 0.766 0.747 0.763
R2 0.128 - 0.120 - 0.116 - 0.102 - 0.125 - 0.124 - 0.044 - 0.054 -
Observations 1,258,172 218,505 662,784 190,076 1,258,012 221,053 668,789 192,325 1,078,368 192,910 578,792 168,914 1,230,284 219,782 665,878 191,116
"Must be married"
"Always use husband's 
name"
Investment Liquidity
Notes:  This table examines the robustness of the relationship between family ownership and measures of conservatism to alternative classification of married owners. "Always use husband's name" excludes region
where the percentage of women who answer "Yes" to the question "Do you always use your husband's last name?" is below the sample's first quartile (67.9%). Responses are from the 1995 Eurobarometer survey. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. In "must be married" specifications firms that are classified as "married-owners 
family" but not as "must be married" are reclassified as "non-married-owners family". * and ** indicate statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 5. Robustness Checks for Marriage Owner Classification and Conservatism
"Must be married"
"Always use husband's 
name"
Leverage
"Must be married"
"Always use husband's 
name""Must be married"
"Always use husband's 
name"
Sales growth
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Dependent variable:
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners 0.043** 0.060** 0.039** 0.069** 0.024** 0.033** 0.017** 0.041**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married Family 
Owners 0.009** 0.034** 0.012** 0.021** 0.008** 0.020** 0.007** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated Owners -0.000 Base -0.001 Base -0.001* Base -0.004** Base
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(Sales )t-1 -0.008** -0.020** -0.010** -0.023** -0.006** -0.012** -0.009** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Firm Age  (×10) -0.003** -0.051** 0.034** -0.055** 0.001** -0.010** 0.005** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
First stage (Dummmy for Married 
Owners ):
Region Divorce Rate -1.868** -2.303** -1.919** -2.343**
(0.704) (0.330) (0.697) (0.328)
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the first-
stage: 34.59** 52.26** 36.77** 55.58**
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(b)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the second 
stage: - 1.25 - 0.22 - 0.68 0.65
Sample average: 0.132 0.186 0.155 0.198 0.076 0.092 0.083 0.097
R2 0.066 - 0.082 - 0.081 - 0.080 -
Observations 1,254,515 219,210 665,829 190,516 1,256,696 220,814 668,102 192,128
"Must be married"
"Always use 
husband's name"
Profit Margin 
Table 6. Robustness Checks for Marriage Owner Classification and Financial Performance
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the relationship between family ownership and measures 
of conservatism. Sales growth is the annual difference in log sales. "Always use husband's name" excludes regions where the 
percentage of women who answer "Yes" to the question "Do you always use your husband's last name?" is below the sample's
first quartile (67.9%). Responses are from the 1995 Eurobarometer survey. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. In "must be married" specifications 
firms that are classified as "married-owners family" but not as "must be married" are reclassified as "non-married-owners 
family". * and ** indicate statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
"Must be married"
Return on Assets
"Always use husband's 
name"
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Ownership change: 
Dependent variable: 
ΔSales 
Growth, 
2007-2011
ΔInvest-
ment,    
2007-2011
ΔROA, 
2007-2011
ΔSales 
Growth, 
2007-2011
ΔInvest-
ment,    
2007-2011
ΔROA, 
2007-2011
ΔSales 
Growth, 
2007-2011
ΔInvest-
ment,    
2007-2011
ΔROA, 
2007-2011
Dummy for Ownership Change 0.051** 0.059** -0.029** 0.013 0.019 0.032** -0.003 0.021 0.034**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003)
ln(Sales ) 0.067** 0.017** 0.021** 0.048** 0.002 0.017** 0.074** 0.049** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Firm Age  (×10) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002* -0.001 0.002* 0.001** 0.002 0.001**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001)
Observations 80,369 94,474 82,707 80,369 94,474 82,707 80,369 94,474 82,707
R2 0.072 0.033 0.017 0.073 0.034 0.019 0.073 0.034 0.019
Δ Sample Average -0.285 -0.181 -0.121 -0.285 -0.181 -0.121 -0.285 -0.181 -0.121
Married Family to Unrelated Non-Married Family to Unrelated Unrelated to Unrelated
Notes: This table presents the estimation results for the effect of changes in ownership structure on changes in sales growth, investment and ROA. All 
models are differenced cross-sectional specifications, where variables are differenced over the period 2011 and 2007. All regressions include a complete set 
of industry and country dummies. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the  5% 
and 1% level, respectively.
Table 7. Effects of Ownership Changes on Sales Growth, Investment, and ROA
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Dependent variable:
Firm sample:
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners -0.014** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.013** -0.005** -0.005** 0.048** 0.033** 0.014** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married 
Family Owners -0.002 0.001 Base Base -0.001 -0.001 Base Base 0.014** 0.004** Base Base
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated 
Owners Base Base Base Base Base Base
Share equity by dominant family 
shareholders -0.008** -0.009** 0.005** 0.004* 0.037** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Sales )t-1 -0.065** -0.065** -0.068** -0.068** -0.024** -0.024** -0.031** -0.031** -0.002** -0.001** -0.009** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age  (×10) -0.043** -0.044** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029** -0.004** -0.004** -0.018** -0.017** -0.021** -0.021**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(b)=(c) p>0.10 p>0.10 - - p>0.10 p>0.10 - - p<0.01 p<0.01 - -
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 - - p<0.01 p<0.01 - - p<0.01 p<0.01 - -
Sample average: 0.200 0.200 0.161 0.161 0.129 0.129 0.116 0.116 0.132 0.132 0.146 0.146
R2 0.119 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.121 0.121 0.119 0.119 0.057 0.058 0.128 0.129
Observations 831,199 831,199 307,710 307,710 838,690 838,690 310,167 310,167 836,364 836,364 308,917 308,917
Notes:  This table examines the relationship between ownership concentration and sales growth, investment and return on assets. Share equity by 
dominant family shareholders is the share of equity at the surname level (the sum of equity held by shareholders that have the same surname). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. * and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 8. Ownership Concentration in Family Firms
Sales growth
Multi-owner Family 
Return on Assets
Multi-owner Family Multi-owner Family 
Investment
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Estimation: OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Sample All All All All
Firm 
Age >1st 
quartile 
No. 
employees 
>1st 
quartile 
Dummy for Family Owners -0.041**
(0.003)
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners -0.040** -0.042** -0.161** 0.142** -0.107**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.031) (0.039) (0.026)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married 
Family Owners -0.042** -0.044** -0.061** -0.057** -0.059**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated Owners -0.006** -0.006* -0.008** Base Base Base
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Dummy for Female Owner 0.003
(0.003)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.114** 0.114** 0.115** 0.187** 0.176** 0.184**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age  (×10) 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.021** 0.016** 0.030**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
First stage (Dummmy for Married 
Owners ):
Region Divorce Rate -1.624** -1.854** -1.935**
(0.560) (0.670) (0.691)
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the first-
stage: 30.68** 15.51** 17.01**
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) - p>0.10 p>0.10 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05
(b)=(c) - p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
(a)=(b)=(c) - p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
χ2-statistic against the null that 
divorce rate is irrelevant in the 
second stage: 2.28 2.33 0.36
Sample average: 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.70 3.70 3.70
R2 0.302 0.302 0.296 - - -
Observations 748,159 748,159 748,159 86,616 66,231 53,728
Notes:  This table examines the relationship between family ownership and average employee wage. In 
Columns 4-6, Dummy for Married Family Owners  is instrumented by region divorce rate using a 
treatment effects model. Region controls include GDP, employment rate, geographical size, population 
size and competitiveness index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the  
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 9. Wages
Dependent variable: ln(Wage per employee)
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All All
Exc. 
Single 
Owners All
Exc. 
Single 
Owners All
Exc. 
Single 
Owners
(a) Dummy for Married Family 
Owners 0.853** 0.870** 0.903** 0.852** 0.875** 0.904* 0.978
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.046)
(b) Dummy for Non-Married 
Family Owners 0.899** 0.913** 0.940** 0.910** 0.934** 0.895** 0.955
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
(c) Dummy for Unrelated 
Owners 0.992 0.991 Base 0.999 Base 0.938* Base
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
Dummy for Female Owner 0.990 0.990 0.996 0.967* 0.971 1.03 1.05
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) (0.034)
Firm Age 0.997** 0.998** 0.998* 1.01 1,01* 0.996** 0.998
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Sales) 0.977** 0.996** 0.974** 0.987* 0.957** 1.00 1.00
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
ROA 1.08 1.09 1.12* 1.15* 0.789* 0.747*
(0.046) (0.059) (0.053) (0.071) (0.082) (0.096)
Liquidity 0.677** 0.633** 0.646** 0.595** 0.786** 0.745**
(0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.055) (0.065)
Leverage 1.38** 1.35** 1.36** 1.32** 1.42** 1.39**
(0.026) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037) (0.055) (0.065)
Hypotheses testing (p-value ):
(a)=(b) p<0.05 p=0.09 p>0.10 p<0.05 p<0.05 p>0.10 p>0.10
(b)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 - p<0.01 - p>0.10 -
(a)=(c) p<0.01 p<0.01 - p<0.01 - p>0.10 -
Observations 228,230 188,209 122,945 136,875 85,040 51,334 37,905
Chi2 29,359.1 23,170.6 15,084.0 15,515.1 9,759.3 4,759.1 3,372.0
% exit 14.5 13.8 13.4 14.4 14.2 12.0 11.5
 Firm Age≤Median (9) Firm Age>Median
Table 10. Firm Survival: Cox Hazard Models
Notes: This table reports the hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard models that examine the effect of family 
ownership on firm exit. The time variable in the hazard models is time to exit, which is a censored variable. A firm is 
labeled as having exited if it submits its most recent report before 2005. All models include year, industry and country 
dummies. Hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. * and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively.
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